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## STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# CREATING A UNIFIED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS BETWEEN THE GUARD AND ARMY

BY

COLONEL DAVID J. LAY United States Army National Guard

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## **ABSTRACT**

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In a time of diminishing resources, the Army and Army National Guard need to work in concert to improve and maintain the Total Force concept. There needs to be consensus on the assets and liabilities of each organization so that a unified effort can be made to preserve and strengthen our position as part of this nations total defense structure. The paper looks at the relationship between the Army and Guard and the difficulty of creating a successful joint venture in our current environment. It looks at the history of the Guard and the efforts that have made in the past to create a successful joint venture.

## Creating a Unified Strategy for Success Between the Guard and Army

Just as large competing corporations fight for market share and profits in the business world, the United States Army and the Army National Guard are vying for force structure and relevance as part of our National Military Strategy. What makes the current competition between the Army and Guard more difficult is the environment of declining resources they are both operating in. This competition is not new, over the years the efforts of these two organizations to work together has vacillated between a position of unity and outright conflict. The purpose of this paper is to look at the current competition and determine if there are better ways to create a joint venture or strategic alliance that will result in a winning situation for both organizations.

Just as our National Military Strategy is an integral part of our National Security Strategy, we must strive for an Army National Guard that is a relevant part of the Active Army.

No nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or insure it victory in time of war.

Calvin Coolidge, speech (1925)<sup>1</sup>

When we define a strategic alliance as a partnership which takes advantage of the particular expertise or other resources of each organization and we agree on the advantages each organization offers, we can create a total force that is greater than the sum of the parts. Just as in the business world, these alliances do not come easily. If there is a recognized need for both

parties in the agreement, the outcome, although complex, can be very successful.<sup>2</sup> It is this result we must strive for between the Army and Army National Guard.

To evaluate the differences between two organizations and determine their compatibility, we need to look at their history. Hopefully we will see differences that, when combined, will create a stronger national military defense structure.

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Our early American policies toward manning armies was derived from our English military traditions. In England as early as the 1500's, the British were using a system of both "regular" and "reserve" forces. These regular forces were used in perusing the Crown's ventures around the world while the primary purpose of the reserve was the preservation of the homeland. When the early English Colonists arrived in America they had the concept of a local militia firmly planted in their minds.<sup>3</sup>

The colonial militias were established in the early 1600's based on three major conceptions:

- Local recruiting and the election of officers.
- Short periods of active duty for immediate threats only.
- Territorial restrictions on service when on active duty.

The early officers in the militia were usually trusted leaders in the communities where they lived.<sup>4</sup> Today the Guard does not elect their officers and there are no territorial restrictions when activated for federal service. One of the major differences between the early militia and the Guard

today is that back in colonial times every able-bodied man was expected to be a member of the militia.

With the formation of a new nation and the establishment of a Constitution in 1789, it is important to see how our founding fathers envisioned our military requirements. The following is an interpretive summary of these clauses by Russell F. Weigley:

[Congress] might call the state militias into federal service "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." It might "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. . . ."

[T]he Constitution also divided military power between the federal government and the states. The states retained their historic militias, with authority to appoint their officers and conduct their training (although Congress might prescribe the system under which training was to be conducted, and although no state might keep up troops without the consent of Congress). The militias might be called into federal service only for limited purposes, "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel innovations." The Second Amendment further guaranteed the status on the militia by declaring: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

[T]he Constitution . . . retained the dual military system bequeathed to the United States by its history: a citizen soldiery enrolled in the state militias, plus a professional Army of the type represented by the British Army or, more roughly, the Continental Army.<sup>5</sup>

In the early 1800's the militia component of this nation's defense began to transition from a mandatory enrollment to a volunteer one. It was also during this period, with the influx of immigrants that ethnic units began to appear. Officers continued to be elected by the members of their unit and to be the more wealthy educated leaders of the community.<sup>6</sup>

During the Mexican War of 1846 and 1847 the militia made up 70% of the U.S. Army which was fought entirely on foreign soil. It was during this war that we have the first record of a conflict between the Regular Army officers and the militia volunteers. This conflict, resulting from a lack of confidence in the volunteers, was partially dispelled as the militia played an

important part of winning critical battles. It was during this period that the concept of regular officer leadership supported by a citizen/soldier fighting force was adopted and remained in effect for the next 100 years.<sup>7</sup>

All through the nineteenth century the system of a small regular standing army supported by a militia proved very capable of meeting the international and domestic military mobilization requirements. During the Civil War the existing forces were divided along geographic lines. When the standing army and the militia failed in providing adequate forces on both sides, the states went to a mandatory conscription system. The Civil War draft law established quotas for each state and was based on the existing legal obligation to serve in the militia. The majority of Civil War battle streamers are carried by National Guard units. In the South, Guard units still carry battle honors depicting their lineage to the Confederate military.

Between the Civil War and the pre-World War I period there was a substantial effort to emulate the conscription systems and reserve obligations that could be found with the Continental European powers. However, since no need for a massive military force needed on short notice could be foreseen, these efforts faltered. Additionally there were those who felt that creating a large and mandatory army would create major constitutional problems. The National Guard as it was now known had considerable political clout and was not about to be overshadowed by the federal military structure. Lastly, the majority of American people did not want to see conscription or a large standing army operating in their free society. <sup>10</sup>

In the early 1900's Congress enacted three statutes that impacted the National Guard.

The Dick Act of 1903, the National Defense Act of 1916, and the National Defense Act of 1920,

all helped to calm the controversy between those who continued to favor a Continental European system and those who wanted the military left as it was. The essence of these three public laws, as they affected the National Guard are as follows:

- A voluntary recruited standing force, large in terms of proportion of the total population of the United States but smaller than those in Continental Europe.
- The establishment of federal Reserve forces, primarily with support, specialist, and technical missions, while ground combat Reserve forces remained almost wholly the responsibility of the National Guard.
- Increased federal control of, involvement in, and financial support for National Guard training, organization, and equipment, and increased Guard liability for federal service, without lessening the state militia responsibilities of the Guard.
- Establishment of a Reserve Officers Training Corps program with a stated mission of producing Reserve commissioned officers, but not at all colleges and universities on a completely compulsory basis.<sup>11</sup>

During World War I all of the National Guard was activated. The Guard played a major role in the war, providing 40% of the combat strength. Divisional units were organized by state and three of the first five U. S. Army divisions to enter combat in World War I were from these National Guard divisions. One of these divisions, the 30th, made up of guardsmen from the Carolinas and Tennessee, won more Metals of Honor than any other division in the war.

In World War II the National Guard again played an important role. Nine Guard divisions saw combat in European theaters and nine divisions fought in the Pacific. The 34th from Minnesota, Iowa and South Dakota claims they spent more days in combat than any other division during the war. Guard divisions such as the 41st, who had been rivals with the active army's 7th Division in training maneuvers before the war, fought side by side in numerous Pacific campaigns. <sup>13</sup>

During the Korean War the Guard was again called upon to support our nation's military strategy. By August of 1950, just two months after the war had started, more than 138,500 guardsmen were mobilized to support the war effort. This mobilization created a great deal of bitterness for many guardsmen. The bitterness resulted from having just fought a long and difficult war while those who had never served their country were not being called at all. Many of these men who had served during World War II were now married and raising families. It is this bitterness that may have impacted the decision not to activate combat forces from the Guard during the Vietnam War. 14

During the Vietnam war the National Guard had its hands full here at home. The urban riots and anti-war demonstrations across the country caused many states to activate their state militia for riot control duties.<sup>15</sup>

The role of the Army National Guard was uncertain during the Cold War. In 1957 GEN

Abrams testified before the House Armed Services subcommittee and made the following

statement:

"Army defense plans in case of war call for carefully integrated employment of the active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. All must be ready to mesh smoothly, quickly and efficiently according to a calculated time schedule". 16

In 1970, the final years of the Vietnam war, the United States was looking for ways to substantially reduce defense expenditures. This effort needed to be made without reducing our ability to keep national security obligations. As a partial solution to this dilemma, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced a policy to reduce the strength and capabilities of the active force while increasing our reliance on the National Guard and Reserve. This plan was the

beginning of the "total force concept". Three years later, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger changed this concept into a policy. 18

The Total Force Policy was the beginning of a new joint venture between the Army and Guard that has yet to be fully tested. In Desert Sheild/Desert Storm many of the combat service and service support Guard units were used but the Army was still unwilling to use National Guard combat units in Southwest Asia.

In 1992 Congress became frustrated with the joint venture between the Army and Guard and asked that a study be done on the "assessment of the existing policies and practices for implementing Total Force Policy of the Department of Defense". This study was to focus on the methodology used in assigning missions between active and reserve components and how the force reductions were affecting the decisions being made.<sup>19</sup>

Like the environment we find today, the study "Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy", was done in a very complex environment. This environment included the uncertainty in Russia, the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations, a declining military budget and uncertainty about the future. Part of the conclusion to this report was that it is very difficult to determine the needs of the Total Force when there is so much uncertainty about the future. The potential resources of personnel and equipment that both the Army and the Army National Guard bring to the table when trying to negotiate an agreement for a joint venture are very uncertain. In order to have a successful unified organization our goal is to establish a force that will be ready at the right time, in the right place, and with the right quality. 21

To determine the potential future role of the Army National Guard in a joint venture with the Army it is important to look at the Guard's assets. The personnel numbers have been declining from a peak of 457,000 in 1989 to about 431,000 in 1992 and are expected to be at less than 390,000 by the end of 1996.

The Army National Guard is made up of more than 2,600 units in about 3,600 communities throughout the nation and its territories. These units represent almost as much combat strength as there is in the active Army.<sup>22</sup>

The force structure is currently being developed to include 341 early deploying contingency force pool units, 15 "enhanced readiness" combat brigades (including one armored cavalry regiment), two Special Forces Groups, eight fully structured combat divisions, two separate brigades and a scout group in Alaska in strategic reserve, and other support forces. Over one half (51%) of the Army National Guard Forces are in the combat divisions and brigades.<sup>23</sup>

The missions that the Army Guard has conducted over the past eighteen months have been varied and numerous. In January of 1995 over 400 guardsmen from 24 states were deployed to the Sinai as part of the 82nd Airborne Division's 4th Battalion. These soldiers were part of the Multi-National Force and Observers Sinai mission. This unit was made up of 72.2 percent Guard, 20.3 percent active and 7.5 percent Reserve soldiers. The leadership for this unit was 45 percent guardsmen.

At the end of 1994 about 400 Guard military police were used to replace active MPs that had been deployed to Haiti as part of the Operation Uphold Democracy. In December 115 soldiers provided deployment assistance for the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and in

January of 1995 more than 165 Guard Special Forces soldiers supported active units in the same operation. Around 1,600 soldiers volunteered nationwide to be used for this operation if needed.<sup>24</sup>

Last year in the U.S. Southern and Atlantic Commands about 6,200 Guard soldiers supported humanitarian and civic activities. In Somalia the Army National Guard assisted in the hand-off of the peace-keeping mission. These soldiers helped train Pakistani pilots, maintenance personnel, and armament specialists for the AH-1S Cobra helicopter.<sup>25</sup>

Here in the United States the Army Guard supported state governors with disaster relief and emergency response. Last year more than 27,000 soldiers fought forest fires in the Pacific Northwest, aided earthquake victims in southern California and flood victims throughout the southeast. They responded to 88 natural disasters and 326 other emergencies.<sup>26</sup>

The view of the Army National Guard history tells us that the Guard has been and continues to be a key player in this nation's security. Over the last several years the Guard has increasingly been involved with military and humanitarian missions while its strength has been declining.

## LOOKING AT THE NATIONAL GUARD FROM AN ARMY'S PERSPECTIVE

When the crisis turns into something bigger, like Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, far greater numbers of National Guardsmen and Reservists must be called up. We simply cannot go to war without them.

Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993

The Army was created 14 June 1775, more than 100 years after the Army National Guard claims its origin. When the Continental Congress gave the authority to create a military force to serve under its control, it relied on the citizen soldier. The Army believes that it has always adhered to the two American ideals under which it was incorporated of civilian control of the armed forces, and reliance on the citizen soldier. FM 100-1 does not define whether citizen soldier is sinomonus with professional soldier or they are referring to the reserve forces.

When we look at the Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-1 we find that the Army believes that for them to be versatile, "there must be a high degree of compatibility between the Active and Reserve Component.." It also points out that as the Army cycles through periods of resource constraints and sufficiency, it varies its need for the Guard and Reserve. This means that in times of scarcity it will depend more on the Guard and Reserve for tasks and force structure that are not needed in a big hurry. Although not stated, the inference could be that when the Army has all the funding and force structure it wants it does not have a need for the Guard.

We know that the Army has often had reservations about the ability of the Guard to perform its mission. During the War with Mexico the Army complained that the militia volunteer troops were sloppy and poorly disciplined. This attitude about the Guard reappeared during subsequent wars.<sup>29</sup> It is perceived by many National Guard officers that Army generals treat them as second-class soldiers and view guardsmen as amateurs<sup>30</sup>

In 1792, 1916, and 1920 the Army attempted to eliminate the Militia System and replace it with a Federal Militia System. The Continental Plan, defeated by Congress in 1916 and 1920 was based on the premise that the Militia System had been a failure from the time of the War of 1812 with Mexico.

What has made the relationship between the Active Army and Guard even more strained over the last several years is the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the perceived need for down sizing the military structure. The Bottom-Up Review published by the Secretary of Defense back in October of 1993 established the requirement to maintain sufficient military power to be able to win two major regional conflicts (MRC) that occur nearly simultaneously. This determination concluded that our force structure was larger than required and the resultant down sizing of the military began. The plan developed by the Bottom-Up Review was to transition the Army National Guard to a combat force of about 37 brigades, of which 15 would be enhanced readiness brigades. The 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades were designated and the balance of the combat forces remained in eight National Guard divisions. The goal was to have these enhanced brigades capable of deploying within 90 days. Its was determined that all other combat forces would maintain a lower readiness posture and would be used for the following missions:

- Extended Crises
- Peace Operations
- Deterrent Hedge
- Domestic Missions<sup>32</sup>

There are those in the Army that feel Congress has shielded the National Guard from deep cuts at the expense of active forces. They question why they are spending \$1 billion a year on payroll, training and equipment for units when military planners can see no war big enough or long enough to ever need them. In the words of one senior Defense Department official, "There is a lot of the Army National Guard that's just irrelevant to our strategy." 33

There are some Army officials that would like to see the Guard combat divisions eliminated so the money could be diverted to the active-duty Army. This position in not a new one, but it is this issue that has created a great deal of division between the Army and Guard.

In a recent press release, Secretary of Defense William Perry announced the Reserve component force structure would be reduced by 1.6 percent, or 15,963 positions, by the end of FY 1996. This is the third year of reductions in a five-year force restructuring strategy in response to the requirements of the post-Cold War environment. In making this announcement, Secretary Perry made the following statement:

"As the United States moves into the next century, being militarily ready will mean being prepared to conduct a broad range of missions, including new ones, without spreading the force too thin. It is vital to the United States that its Total Force retain its present ability to function successfully in a wide range of operational environments. The forces being restructured now will provide the capabilities needed to make that happen." <sup>34</sup>

This statement implies that we are going to be asked to do more with less in the future. It also indicates that the Total Force structure is functioning successfully and should not be changed.

## LOOKING AT THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FROM WITHIN

The current vision statement of the Army National Guard is, "A balanced warfighting land force with embedded domestic capabilities ... a resourced, ready and relevant community-based military force for the 21st Century." It is the only force with a dual responsibility, one to the state or territory in which it serves, and one to the Regular Army. The Guard see's itself as emerging from a self-equipped, community militia in colonial times to the "...well-armed fighting force and a valuable component in the nation's emergency preparedness network...," of today. 36

The Guard is very proud of its partnership with the Army when its relationship is built upon the militia-based defense concept that it believes is the cornerstone of this nation's constitutional foundation. The Guard believes that it was our founding fathers' original intent to structure the armed forces with a small well-trained standing army and a large, well-trained and accessible National Guard. In contrast to the Active Army's position on force structure, the Guard believes that by increasing the reliance on the Guard, the nation will get "more bang for the buck." The Guard believes that to create a successful joint venture we must agree on a cost-effective balanced total force structure.<sup>37</sup>

Several of the Army National Guard's eight combat division commanders disagree with the Active Army on the current restructuring proposals. While the Active Army agrees with the recommendations of the Roles and Missions Commission on eliminating these divisions, the division commanders strongly disagree. The commanders cite the cost savings, civil response, and security for reasons not to eliminate the divisions.<sup>38</sup>

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deborah R. Lee, recently outlined four goals for the Guard and Reserve which are consistent with the Guard's leadership perspective. The first is to maximize the Guard contribution to the total force in war and peace. The second goal is to promote the mission readiness of the Guard and Reserve in support of the National Security Strategy. The third is to improve the quality of life for the Guard and the final goal is to leverage the military capabilities and readiness training to support our partnership with civilian communities.<sup>39</sup>

The Guard has admitted that it has had deficiencies in the past. It also believes that the Army needs to bear the responsibility for the deficiencies. MG Ellard Walsh, president of the National Guard Association of the United States in 1944, stated that if those in the Army that were trying to get rid of the Guard would devote the same energy to making it better we would not have had the deficiencies. 40

## CREATING A SUCCESSFUL JOINT VENTURE

To determine the best relationship for a joint venture between the Guard and Army we must understand the roles and missions of each. In defining the roles and missions we will first look at our National Security Strategy and then our National Military Strategy.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, as published by the White House in February of 1995, relies heavily upon the U.S. military to achieve its objectives. This strategy is based on three key objectives. The first objective is to sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight, the second is to bolster America's economic revitalization

and the third is the promotion of democracy abroad.<sup>41</sup> The first and third objectives rely on the use of our military strength and the fact that our nation has unparalleled military capabilities.<sup>42</sup>

In order for the military to protect and advance U.S. interest, it must be able to deploy robust and flexible forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks. The tasks that should involve both the Army and Guard are as follows:

- Deterring and Defeating Aggression in Major Regional Conflicts
- Providing a Credible Overseas Presence
- Contribution to Multilateral Peace Operation
- Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts and Other National Security Objectives

The Active Army has seen its role in the National Security Strategy drastically change over the last two hundred years. Likewise the Guard has changed substantially from its origin of providing regional protection for the colonists, to conducting missions around the world.<sup>43</sup> While the Enhanced Brigades train for the potential action in a MRC, other units have been involved around the world in Peace Keeping Operations in Bosnia and Haiti, as well as backfilling units in Germany that have been providing our overseas presence.<sup>44</sup>

In meeting our National Security Strategy the Army and Guard may be called on to conduct a wide variety of tasks. In addition to operating in overseas environments, they must be able to conduct peace enforcement, counterterrorism and punitive attacks, noncombatant evacuations, counter-narcotics operations and humanitarian and disaster relief. These missions are all in addition to the traditional military roles of fighting and winning wars.<sup>45</sup>

Our National Security Strategy points out that it is preferable that our forces are prepared to confront any MRC with the assistance of our allies and friends, but we must be able to do it

unilaterally if required.<sup>46</sup> Another critical aspect of our strategy is deciding when and how to employ U.S. Forces. In deciding the best type of joint venture we need between the Army and Guard, it is imperative that there is a clearly defined strategy on when and how our forces should be used. The type of vital, important and humanitarian interest that is defined by our political leadership will make it easier to determine the required force structure.

From our National Security Strategy comes the National Military Strategy which is developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This strategy is described as a "strategy of flexible and selective engagement", and is made up of three parts. The three parts, peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars, are facilitated by two complimentary concepts of overseas presence and power projection. <sup>47</sup>

The five essential elements required of our military to meet our strategy of fighting and winning two MRC's nearly simultaneously are quality men and women, readiness, enhancements, modernization and balance. It is this last element that is related to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities between the Guard and Army. <sup>48</sup> It is here that the requirement of having a balanced combat force, with a balanced infrastructure, is established.

To reduce the risks associated with a smaller total force, the Department of Defense is leveraging the capabilities of the Guard and Reserve to meet the objectives of our National Security Strategy. There is now more reliance on the combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units of the Army National Guard in the post-Cold War period. In addition to helping control peace time costs, these units are also able to support the required states' missions.<sup>49</sup>

As they have in the past, the Army and Army National Guard are currently trying to determine the best way to integrate the two organization into a successful part of our military force. Unfortunately, when the two organizations try to agree on what that structure should be, the problem of complexity, uncertainty and conflict all hinder the creation of a unified organization.

#### **CONCLUSION:**

When there is a limited vision of what our needs are for meeting our National Security

Strategy objectives, and when the resources that will be available in the future to meet those needs
are uncertain, it is very difficult to come to agreement on how to create a joint venture. When
each organization sees the need for its own expertise and resources as greater than the other
organization sees it, there is little chance of creating a cohesive and productive unified effort.

When both organizations can agree on what the end product should be there is a very good
chance of creating a profitable and lasting joint venture.

There is agreement that both organizations need each other in the current force structure.

What is unclear is the confidence of the Active Army in the Guard to accomplish its role. There is also controversy on the size that each organization needs to be.

To resolve these differences of opinion there needs to be a sincere effort to work toward consensus at the highest level of both organizations. The agreement needs to be tied to missions for the Guard that they are willing and capable of accomplishing.

There also needs to be agreement on the size of each force given the current and potential force reductions. When determining size, the cost effectiveness and historical accomplishments of the organizations needs to be factored in.

The effort to create a more efficient joint venture must be done with the focus on the nation's and states' best interest rather than what is best for the individual organizations.

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